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Abstract 
This paper reports on a preliminary analysis of performance indicators on 3,020 platforms 
operating in the Gulf of Mexico between 1996 and 2010. Statistical analysis reveals that company-
reported incidents (such as blowouts, fires, injuries, and pollution) increase with water depth, controlling 
for platform characteristics such as age, quantity of oil and gas produced, and number of producing wells. 
In addition to company-reported incidents, we examine government inspections and the type of 
enforcement action (warning, component shut-in, facility shut-in, or civil penalty review) following an 
inspection. Fewer incidents of noncompliance are detected during inspections on deepwater platforms 
compared with shallow-water platforms; however, the magnitude of the effect of depth on noncompliance 
is not large. We provide a preliminary analysis of the effect of prior findings of noncompliance, 
suggesting that noncompliance is persistent.  We also find significant variability in both self-reported 
incidents and noncompliance across leaseholders. 
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Preliminary Empirical Assessment of Offshore Production 
Platforms in the Gulf of Mexico 
Lucija Muehlenbachs, Mark A. Cohen, and Todd Gerarden 
All findings, opinions, statements, and recommendations contained in this report are solely those of its 
authors.  The report has been submitted to the staff of the National Commission on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil 
Spill and Offshore Drilling, but the report is not the work product of the Commission or its staff, and should not be 
construed in any respect as the official or unofficial findings, opinions, statements, or recommendations of the 
Commission or its staff. 
Executive Summary 
This paper reports on a preliminary analysis of performance indicators on platforms in 
the Gulf of Mexico between 1996 and 2010. According to data from the Bureau of Ocean Energy 
Management, Regulation and Enforcement (BOEMRE), there are currently 3,020 platforms on 
the Outer Continental Shelf in the Gulf of Mexico. Information on platform characteristics is 
used to analyze differences in company-reported incidents and the enforcement actions taken 
following government inspections in the Gulf of Mexico. Statistical analysis reveals that 
company-reported incidents (such as blowouts, fires, injuries, and pollution) increase with water 
depth, controlling for platform characteristics such as age, quantity of oil and gas produced, and 
number of producing wells. For an average platform (i.e., a platform with the sample’s average 
age, annual production, number of producing wells, and other characteristics), each 100 feet of 
added depth increases the probability of a company-reported incident by 8.5 percent. 
In addition to self-reported incidents, we examine government inspections and the type of 
enforcement action (warning, component shut-in, facility shut-in, or civil penalty review) 
                                                 
 Muehlenbachs, Fellow; Cohen, Vice President for Research; Gerarden, Research Assistant, Resources for the 
Future, Washington, DC. 
DISCLAIMER: This project was funded by the Department of Energy, National Energy Technology Laboratory an 
agency of the United States Government, through a support contract with Booz Allen Hamilton, Inc.  Neither the 
United States Government nor any agency thereof, nor any of their employees, nor Booz Allen Hamilton, Inc., nor 
any of their employees, makes any warranty, express or implied, or assumes any legal liability or responsibility for 
the accuracy, completeness, or usefulness of any information, apparatus, product, or process disclosed, or represents 
that its use would not infringe privately owned rights. Reference herein to any specific commercial product, process, 
or service by trade name, trademark, manufacturer, or otherwise does not necessarily constitute or imply its 
endorsement, recommendation, or favoring by the United States Government or any agency thereof. The views and 
opinions of authors expressed herein do not necessarily state or reflect those of the United States Government or any 
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following an inspection. Fewer incidents of noncompliance (INCs) are detected during 
inspections on deepwater platforms compared with shallow-water operations; however, the 
magnitude of the effect of depth on noncompliance is not large: with each 100 feet of added 
depth, the probability of an incident of noncompliance decreases by 0.05 percent. We also 
provide a preliminary analysis of the effect of prior findings of noncompliance, suggesting that 
noncompliance is persistent. Our results also suggest that the rate of noncompliance citation 
varies by inspector. 
Examination of the 10 companies that produced the most oil and gas (by volume) in the 
Gulf of Mexico in 2009 indicates significant variation in company-reported incidents and 
inspector detected incidents of noncompliance across companies. The analysis suggests that the 
probability of a reported incident increases with BP as an operator (all else equal) compared with 
operators not included in the 10 largest producers. Of the 10 largest producers, BHP Billiton is 
the only firm with a higher probability of reporting an incident than BP. When we examine the 
probability of an incident of non-compliance detected during an inspection, we see that BP is less 
likely to have incidents of non-compliance than smaller producers. Of the 10 producers, Eni US, 
Apache, and Chevron have a similar (or lower) probability of an incident of non-compliance as 
BPBP. For an average platform, having BP as an operator increases the probability of a 
company-reported incident by 96 percent and decreases the probability of an enforcement action 
upon inspection by 9.5 percent. 
Our preliminary analysis has provided some important insights as well as raised many 
questions that are worthy of further research using the data that we have compiled: 
  The analysis is specific to offshore platforms. Data on mobile offshore drilling units are 
more difficult to analyze because we have data on these only when there is an incident 
reported. Since we do not know the location of these drilling units when they do not have 
an incident, it is not possible to calculate a rate of incidents. However, further data 
collection and refinement, as well as an analysis of mobile drilling unit inspection results, 
might prove useful. 
  We find that if a platform if cited for an incident of noncompliance during one inspection,  
citation of an incident of noncompliance during the subsequent inspection is more likely.  
However, from this observation we are unable to determine the effect of enforcement 
actions, because it could be the case that had these platforms not received any 
enforcement action, they would be even poorer performers.  Further statistical analysis of 
enforcement and noncompliance data should provide important insights into the causal Resources for the Future  Muehlenbachs, Cohen, and Gerarden 
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connections between inspections, warnings, component and facility shut-ins, civil penalty 
review, and subsequent reported incidents and incidents of noncompliance.  
  We find significant variability in the probability of a company-reported incident by type 
of company. This is using a very broad definition of incidents, which include everything 
from a loss of well control to a fatality. It would also be interesting to examine 
differences in specific types of incidents as well as firm characteristics (e.g., size, 
financial capacity, ownership structure). 
  Future research should investigate the relationship between self-reported incidents, 
findings of noncompliance, and actual performance. Our analysis of incidents is 
necessarily based on self-reporting. Although firms that self-report a higher level of 
incidents (e.g., accidents or spills) are generally more likely to be cited during an 
inspection for noncompliance, some exceptions are found. For example, both BP and 
Chevron had higher-than-average incident rates but were less likely to be cited for 
noncompliance. Without further analysis, we do not know whether this is because these 
firms are more likely to self-report than others or whether this is a sign of sub-optimal 
enforcement. 
1. Introduction 
 In the past, high-volume oil spills have been largely associated with crude oil transport. 
Accordingly, the risk analysis literature focuses on accidents associated with transport (Epple 
and Visscher 1984; Stewart and Leschine 1986; Cohen 1986, 1987; Viladrich-Grau and Groves 
1997). Conclusions from existing research on accident prevention monitoring and enforcement in 
the petroleum transport industry are relevant to the study of offshore oil and gas exploration and 
development.  
However, the literature on oil offshore exploration and production, and fixed platforms 
specifically, remains relatively underdeveloped. As a result, findings from empirical analysis of 
offshore oil and gas activity conducted throughout the literature are sometimes inconsistent and 
even contradictory (Jablonowski 2007; Iledare et al. 1997; Shultz 1999). Furthermore, empirical 
analysis of oil exploration and development at current water depths is lacking. This analysis 
seeks to expand the existing literature on predictors of offshore oil production incidents and 
noncompliance with a focus on identifying and analyzing factors relevant to future regulatory 
decisions. Resources for the Future  Muehlenbachs, Cohen, and Gerarden 
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The rest of the paper summarizes the findings of this empirical assessment. The next 
section contains information on platform characteristics, including ownership structure. The third 
section employs a probit regression to analyze the effect of platform characteristics on reported 
incidents. The fourth section studies inspections and incidents of noncompliance, using 
descriptive statistics and probit regressions to study the marginal effects of past enforcement 
action on present compliance. The fifth section extends earlier analysis to include indicators for 
the top oil producers in the Gulf of Mexico in 2009. The final section summarizes findings of 
this analysis and draws conclusions to help guide future regulatory decisions. 
2. Background Information on Offshore Platforms and Production 
In this section, we provide background information on offshore platforms and production 
in the Gulf of Mexico. We distinguish platforms by depth, age, and measures of size and 
complexity. We also characterize the volume of production by lease operator. 
Platform Characteristics 
Two databases1 containing platform characteristics from the Bureau of Ocean Energy 
Management, Regulation and Enforcement (BOEMRE) were used to create a panel containing 
all offshore production facilities (platforms) in the Gulf of Mexico from the year each was first 
installed through 2010. The oldest platforms in the resulting data set are reported to have been 
installed in 1942. Overall, there are 6,056 unique platform “complexes”2 represented in the data 
set. After a platform is abandoned and removed,3 it drops out of the data set; by 2010 only 3,020 
of the 6,056 platforms remain in the data.4 The data set contains information such as the distance 
to shore, water depth, lease number, location (area and block), whether personnel are on board 
                                                 
1 Platform Masters database and Platform Structures database, 
http://www.gomr.boemre.gov/homepg/pubinfo/freeasci/platform/freeplat.html. 
2 A platform complex is a single man-made structure or a group of structures connected by a walkway. A structure 
can be the fixed leg of a platform, a fixed anchor, a semisubmersible floating production system, or a mobile 
production unit, for example. It is not possible to determine the kind of structure where an incident occurred because 
the data are identified by complex; therefore, information on structures is aggregated to the complex. 
3 A platform drops out of the data set after the date when the last structure was removed (according to the removal 
date in the Platform Structures database) if the platform was scheduled to be abandoned (according to the Platform 
Masters database). 
4 This is not to say that the remaining platforms are all producing. As indicated in Table 1, 43 percent of the existing 
(not yet removed) platforms did not produce any oil or gas in 2009. Resources for the Future  Muehlenbachs, Cohen, and Gerarden 
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24 hours per day, whether a platform has a heliport, and the number of beds in the living 
quarters. There is also an indicator of whether the platform is considered a “major complex” 
(defined as a platform that has at least one structure with at least six well completions or two 
pieces of production equipment). Of the platforms in the data set, 21.5 percent of the platforms 
have personnel on board 24 hours per day. Forty-nine percent are considered major complexes 
(see Table 1). In the analysis here, platforms in water depths less than 1,000 feet are considered 
to be in shallow water; those between 1,000 and 4,999 feet are considered deepwater; and 5,000 
feet or more, ultra-deep water. Table 2 shows that platform characteristics vary by water depth: 
unlike platforms in shallow waters, all platforms producing from waters between 1,000 and 
5,000 feet are major complexes and are manned 24 hours a day. Platforms currently in deeper 
water are also younger: platforms are on average 3.2 years old in waters deeper than 5,000 feet, 
10.03 years old in waters between 1,000 and 5,000 feet, and 22.69 years old in water less than 
1,000 feet (Table 2). 
 
Table 1. Platform Characteristics  
 mean  sd  min  max  count 
Age (years)  22.47  14.83  0  67  3016 
Distance to Shore (miles)  34.05  30.57  2  195  3014 
Water Depth (feet)  157.1  503.9  8  8000  3016 
Major Complex (Indicator)  .492  .5  0  1  3016 
Manned 24 Hours (Indicator)  .2152  .411  0  1  3016 
Beds in Living Quarters  16.67  23.8  0  281  762 
Heliport Present (Indicator)  .6963  .4599  0  1  3016 
 Cranes  .8033  .7431  0  5  2761 
Annual Oil Production (mbbl)  378.2  2882  0  68302  1503 
Annual Gas Production (mmcf)  1431  8130  0  292462  1706 
Inactive (Indicator)  .432  .4954  0  1  3016 
 Producing Wells  1.981  3.434  0  47  2610 
Wells Drilled (2009)  .5556  .8755  0  4  90 
Cumulative Wells Drilled  4.65  7.518  0  89  3016 
No. Well Operations (2009)  1.567  1.171  1  7  90 
Cumulative Well Operations  6.817  12.49  0  234  3016 
Avg. Depth of Wells Drilled (2009) (feet)  12148  5743  1706  26956  30 
Avg. Time to Drill Wells (2009) (days)  35.89  28.7  5  149  37 
Observations 3016         
Notes: Data on all offshore platforms in the Gulf of Mexico, 2009. A total of 3,016 nonremoved platforms in 2009 
are represented in the data set, with the earliest platform having been installed in 1942. Well operations are separate 
operations in a single borehole (e.g., reentry, recompletion, horizontal drilling, or directional drilling). 
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Table 2. Platform Characteristics, by Water Depth 
 Shallow  Deep  Ultra-deep 
  mean  sd mean sd mean sd 
Age (years)  22.69  14.82  10.03  6.687  3.2  2.53 
Distance to Shore (miles)  33.02  29.09  91.97  45.15  130.4  42.35 
Water Depth (feet)  102.8  103.5  2900  1230  6427  945.2 
Major Complex (Indicator)  .4845  .4998  1  0  .9  .3162 
Manned 24 Hours (Indicator)  .2034  .4026  1  0  .9  .3162 
Beds in Living Quarters  13.08  13.49  75.21  48.38  90.88  87.1 
Heliport Present (Indicator)  .6919  .4618  1  0  .9  .3162 
Cranes .7784  .7155  2.361  .7983  2.25  .8864 
Annual Oil Production (mbbl)  86.19  264.5  7682  9781  20758  22844 
Annual Gas Production (mmcf)  906.3  2286  11716  11419  64170  95398 
Inactive (Indicator)  .438  .4962  0  0  .2  .4216 
Producing Wells  1.8  3.023  13.31  7.577  7.8  5.731 
Wells Drilled (2009)  .4783  .7398  .4118  .6183  2.5  1.732 
Cumulative Wells Drilled  4.589 7.343 10.47  16.04  1.8  1.932 
Well Operations (2009)  1.478  1.023  1.588  1.228  3  2.449 
Cumulative Well Operations  6.607  11.86  25.19  33.95  3.1  3.315 
Avg. Depth of Wells Drilled (2009) (feet)  9672  3280  19145  6573  18399  2792 
Avg. Time to Drill Wells (2009) (days)  26.35  16.16  44.25  22.98  87.81  46.75 
Observations 2970    36    10   
Note: Data from 2009.  
Annual Production 
Monthly well-level production data for all wells in the Gulf of Mexico from 1996 to 2010 
was obtained through BOEMRE’s website.5 This data set contains a unique well identifier, (the 
API well number), monthly gas volume, monthly oil volume, and days on production. Another 
data set available online through BOERME,6 for boreholes, is used to assign a platform identifier 
to the API well numbers, linking monthly production data to platform characteristics. This data 
set was also used to count the cumulative number of wells drilled at a platform, the number of 
wells drilled in a given year for each platform, the average length of time to drill the wells at a 
platform, and the average depth of the wells drilled at a platform. The API number identifying 
the wellbore contains an “event sequence code” indicating different drilling or completion 
operations of a wellbore (e.g., reworking a well to a deeper formation or drilling horizontally 
                                                 
5 Monthly Production Data, http://www.gomr.boemre.gov/homepg/pubinfo/freeasci/product/freeprod_ogora.html. 
6 Borehole Data, http://www.gomr.boemre.gov/homepg/pubinfo/freeasci/well/freewell.html. Resources for the Future  Muehlenbachs, Cohen, and Gerarden 
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from the wellbore would receive a separate event sequence code). We created a variable to 
indicate the number of event sequence codes per platform to obtain the annual number of well 
operations as well as the cumulative well operations per platform. We also calculated the annual 
platform-level production and the number of wells producing in each year. 
Lease Owners and Designated Lease Operators 
A single lease can have many owners with different percentages of ownership (working 
interests). A lease may also be divided into different aliquots, or portions, and each aliquot may 
have multiple working interests. Data on the lease ownership and designated operator of a lease 
were obtained from BOEMRE’s website.7 These data contain the working interests of all owners 
of offshore leases in the Gulf of Mexico, including all ownership changes from the assignment 
date of the lease to present. From this, the working interest of the designated operator is 
extracted, as well as the number of companies that had an interest in the lease and the minimum, 
mean, and maximum working interest in the lease for every year from the lease assignment date 
to 2010. On average, ownership of a lease is divided among 1.919 companies, ranging from sole 
ownership to 32 companies (Table 3). At any point in time, however, there will be only one 
designated operator of the aliquot. The working interest of the lease operator ranges from 0 to 
100 percent and is 69.4 percent on average (Table 3). According to these data, there are 25,461 
leases assigned in the Gulf of Mexico; however, only 2,757 of these leases are associated with 
platforms (see N in Table 4). The leases associated with platforms have more owners and lower 
working interests by the owners, on average, than leases without platforms. As water depth 
increases, the working interest of the average owner decreases (Table 4). 
   
                                                 
7 Lease Ownership & Operator Data, http://www.gomr.mms.gov/homepg/pubinfo/freeasci/leasing/freeleas.html. Resources for the Future  Muehlenbachs, Cohen, and Gerarden 
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Table 3. Lease Ownership and Designated Lease Operators for All Leases 
 mean  sd  min  max 
No. Owners  1.789  1.365  1  27 
No. Aliquot Portions  1.009  .1126  1  7 
Mean Working Interest (%)  75.42  30.41  3.571  100 
Min Working Interest (%)  70.35  37.01  .0001  100 
Max Working Interest (%)  81.72  24.08  7.551  100 
Lease Operator’s Working Interest  72.71  35.6  0  100 
N  25,461      
Note: Data on all leases in the Gulf of Mexico, 2010. Min (Lease Working Interest) is the lowest ownership 
assignment of a lease in 2010. Max (Lease Working Interest) is the highest ownership assignment of a lease in 2010.  
Table 4. Lease Ownership and Designated Lease Operators, by Water Depth 
 Shallow  Deep  Ultra-deep 
  mean sd mean sd mean sd 
No.  Owners  2.46  2.194 2.256 1.428  2.5  .8367 
No. Aliquot Portions  1.049  .2792  1  0  1  0 
Mean Working Interest (%)  63.99  33.63  57.76  28.45  43.06  11.08 
Min Working Interest (%)  55.09  41.55  48.52  34.99  29.86  12.48 
Max Working Interest (%)  76.14  25.46  69.07  22.48  56.25  18.59 
Lease Operators Working Interest  62.49 38.37 50.17 35.57 35.42 31.82 
N  2712   39    6   
Note: Data on leases with one or more platforms, 2010. 
Platform Operators 
A platform operator is typically the responsible party in event of an oil spill. However, 
there are occasions where a platform ties in production from a well miles away leased to a 
different operator. The subsea lease operator would be financially responsible in the case that a 
spill occurred at the subsea lease, and the surface platform operator would not be. If the spill 
originated from the pipeline, the pipeline right-of-way holder would be responsible. All three 
parties (the surface platform operator, the subsea lessee, and the pipeline right-of-way holder) are 
required to show oil spill financial responsibility. The platform operator, as defined by 
BOEMRE, is either the lease holder or the party designated (and approved) to operate a portion 
of a given lease. The history of platform operators, received from BOEMRE, was used to 
determine the operator of a platform in time t. Each subsidiary of a company is given its own 
“company number.” For example, Shell Offshore Inc. has 10 subsidiaries in the Gulf of Mexico 
(e.g., Shell Consolidated Energy Resources Inc., Shell Deepwater Development Inc., Shell Oil 
Company), each of which has a unique company number. An unofficial list of parent-
subsidiaries was obtained from BOEMRE so that we could match subsidiaries to their parents. Resources for the Future  Muehlenbachs, Cohen, and Gerarden 
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For the remainder of unmatched observations, the parent company found in BOEMRE’s operator 
safety summaries was used. If the platform operator was missing five years before the 
assignment date, the designated operator at the time of the assignment was used. 
Thirty-two firms have been deepwater lease operators in the Gulf of Mexico from 1996 to 
2010 (Appendix, Table A1). Of them, 12 hold only the subsea lease and partner with other firms 
which operate platforms tied into these wells (Table A1).  Of the 20 firms that are platform 
operators, all but three are publicly traded. The market capitalization of these 17 companies 
ranges from less than $1 billion to more than $300 billion. Including the three privately held 
companies, fewer than half (9 of 20) have market capitalizations exceeding $40 billion. 
In 2010, 15 companies were platform operators in deep waters. Table 5 lists these 
companies with the number of shallow, deep, and ultra-deep platforms they operated in 2010, as 
well as the most recent market capitalization estimate available. These 15 companies, out of a 
total of 132 companies, operated 29.6 percent of the platforms in the Gulf of Mexico in 2010. 
 
Table 5. Number of Platforms for Firms with Deepwater Operations, 2010 
Parent company 
Platforms  Market cap. 
($million)  Shallow Deep Ultra-deep 
ATP Oil & Gas Corporation  37 2 0  762
Anadarko Petroleum Corporation  5 5 2  29,100
BHP Billiton Petroleum (Americas) Inc.  3 3 0  135,690
BP Corporation North America Inc.  27 5 4  127,320
Chevron Corporation  352 3 1  169,390
ConocoPhillips Company  0 1 0  90,660
Dynamic Offshore Resources NS, LLC  46 1 0  —
Eni US Operating Co. Inc.  24 2 1  81,980
Exxon Mobil Corporation  54 1 0  337,690
Helix Energy (Energy Resource Technology 
GOM, Inc.)  99 1 0 
1,392
Hess Corporation  0 1 0  20,730
Murphy Exploration & Production Company  0 2 1  12,510
Pisces Energy LLC  45 1 0  —*
Shell Offshore Inc.  12 6 1  110,750
W & T Offshore, Inc.  142 2 0  820
Notes: Market capitalization figures are in million USD using most recent data available. * Pisces Energy LLC filed 
for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection on September 1, 2009 (Reuters). Resources for the Future  Muehlenbachs, Cohen, and Gerarden 
10 
3. Reported Incidents 
Information on company-reported incidents was obtained from BOEMRE. Operators and 
other permit holders are required to report all “incidents” to BOEMRE. Prior to 2006, incidents 
were defined to include all serious accidents, fatalities, injuries, explosions, and fires. The 
incident reporting regulations were made more stringent in 2006,8 requiring companies to report 
not only serious incidents but also incidents that had the potential to be serious (e.g., any incident 
involving structural damage to a facility, injury that led to an evacuation or days away from 
work, or property damage exceeding $25,000). The resulting increase in incident reporting 
illustrates the challenge noted by Cohen (2010) of differentiating between changes in the actual 
number of incidents and the appearance of changes in the number of incidents due to 
developments in monitoring and enforcement. The increase in incident reporting due to this 
change in regulations is apparent in Figure 1, which tracks nonweather-related9 incidents on 
offshore facilities. Jablonowski (2007) analyzes the probability of incidents on offshore drilling 
rigs, taking imperfect reporting of incidents into consideration through use of a detection-
controlled estimation model. In this paper we examine reported incidents and do not try to 
disentangle the probability that an incident occurred from the probability that an incident was 
reported. 
Between 1995 and August 2010, there were 6,372 company-reported incidents. Data on 
the incidents include an indicator for whether the incident involved a blowout, vessel collision, 
fire, explosion, collision, injury, fatality, or pollution; whether it was caused by completion 
equipment, equipment failure, development or production operations, exploration operations, 
human error, a slip or a trip or a fall, or weather; and whether it involved cranes, structural 
damage, or overboard drilling fluid. 
Of these incidents, 4,703 have a platform identifier, 1,105 have a rig number instead of a 
platform identifier, and 564 have neither identifier. If there was only one platform on a lease area 
or block in a year, that platform’s identifier was assigned to incidents that occurred there, to fill 
in missing platform identifiers. This approach added only 14 incidents to our data set. The 
resulting 4,717 incident observations are then merged onto the platform characteristics (24 
incidents do not merge). If there was more than one incident in a year, the platform-year is 
                                                 
8 30 CFR Part 250, Final Rule (FR 19640), Minerals Management Service, U.S. Department of Interior. 
9 Including weather-related incidents in this figure obscures the increase in reporting in 2006, because 2008, a year 
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Table 6. Incidents on Offshore Platforms 
 mean  sd  min  max  count 
Incident  Indicator  .0848 .2786 0 1 54137 
No.  Incidents  .1276 .5487 0 14 54137 
No. Injuries  .00761  .1273  0  12  54137 
No. Fatalities  .001348 .04231  0  3  54137 
Explosion .00109  .03299  0  1  54137 
Blowout .0005357  .02314  0  1  54137 
Equipment Fail  .02237  .1479  0  1  54137 
Human Error  .02074  .1425  0  1  54137 
Accident .07636  .2656  0  1  54137 
Spill .01119  .1052  0  1  54137 
Spill Volume (bbl)  31.92  243.1  0  4834  564 
Weather .01613  .126  0  1  54137 
Structural Damage  .0004803  .02191  0  1  54137 
Crane .007038  .0836  0  1  54137 
Collision .00205  .04523  0  1  54137 
Well Control (Surface)  .00003694 .006078  0  1  54137 
Well Control (Diverter)  .00001847  .004298  0  1  54137 
Slip, Trip, Fall  .003547  .05945  0  1  54137 
Overboard Drill Fluid  .0001108  .01053  0  1  54137 
Exploration .00205  .04523  0  1  54137 
Development, Production  .06853  .2527  0  1  54137 
Observations 54137         
Note: Annual data from all platforms in the Gulf of Mexico, 1995–August 2010.  Incident indicator equals 1 if there 
is one or more incidents on a platform in a year (this is the dependent variable in the probit regression).  
Probit regressions are completed to study the variation in probability of an incident with 
depth, age, distance from shore, and other factors. Because the data are not complete for 2010 
and production data are available starting in 1996, the regression includes only the years 1996 to 
2009. Table 8 presents the marginal effects from probit regressions for the probability that an 
incident is reported. The dependent variable (Incident) is 1 if one or more incidents are reported 
in year t on platform i and 0 otherwise. We display four specifications, each with an increasing 
number of explanatory variables. The first specification includes characteristics of platforms, 
including age, distance to shore, year, and whether the platform is considered a major complex; 
the second specification adds indicators for production activity levels. The third and fourth 
specifications add information on lease ownership. The results reiterate that the probability of an 
incident’s being reported increases with water depth. An increase in the water depth of 100 feet 
increases reported incidents by 0.108 to 0.166 percentage points (as seen in the coefficient on 
Water Depth in Table 8). The predicted increase applies to the average platform—that is, a 
platform with the same age, annual production, number of producing wells, and number of Resources for the Future  Muehlenbachs, Cohen, and Gerarden 
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completions as the average platform in the Gulf. The predicted baseline probability of an 
incident’s being reported on the average platform is 1.4 percent; therefore, an increase of 0.12 
percentage points is equivalent to an 8.5 percent increase of the baseline probability. In analyzing 
reported incidents on offshore drilling rigs, Jablonowski (2007) finds that an indicator for water 
depths deeper than 400 feet is statistically insignificant in determining the likelihood of an 
incident. Our findings also differ from Shultz (1999), who finds for the period of 1986 to 1995 
(10 years before the period we are studying) that water depth had a negative effect on the 
likelihood of accidents. As illustrated in Figure 2, our study period experienced a dramatic 
increase in drilling at the deepest water depths, compared with the study period of Shultz (1999). 
 
Table 7. Incidents on Major Complexes Manned 24 Hours a Day, by Water Depth 
 Shallow  Deep  Ultra-Deep 
  mean  sd  mean sd mean sd 
Incident Indicator  .2282  .4197  .7453  .436  .8095  .3946 
No.  Incidents  .3372  .7772  1.963 2.289 2.467 2.446 
No. Injuries  .02035  .2102  .04173  .2886  .009524  .09759 
No. Fatalities  .00401  .07209 .004317  .06561  0  0 
Explosion .00421  .06475  .002878  .05361  0  0 
Blowout .001403  .03744  .001439  .03793  0  0 
Equipment  Fail  .06766  .2512  .223 .4166 .181 .3868 
Human Error  .05704  .2319  .1842  .3879  .181  .3868 
Accident .2034  .4025  .7209 .4489 .7905 .4089 
Spill .03087  .173  .04604  .2097  .0381  .1923 
Spill Volume (bbl)  26.51  159.8  17.54  30.76  .9541  .355 
Weather  .03198  .1759  .05324 .2247 .04762  .214 
Structural  Damage  .0006014  .02452  0 0 0 0 
Crane  .01704  .1294  .1511 .3584 .2095 .4089 
Collision .002406  .04899 .004317  .06561  0  0 
Well  Control  (Surface)  .0001002  .01001  0 0 0 0 
Well  Control  (Diverter)  .0001002  .01001  0 0 0 0 
Slip, Trip, Fall  .009924  .09913  .01151  .1067  .009524  .09759 
Overboard Drill Fluid  .0003007  .01734 .001439 .03793  0  0 
Exploration .003709  .06079  .0259  .1589  .05714  .2332 
Development,  Production  .1812  .3852  .6576 .4749 .7524 .4337 
Observations  9976    695  105  
Note: Annual data from all major complexes manned 24 hours a day, 1995–August 2010.   Incident indicator equals 
1 if there is one or more incidents on a platform in a year (this is the dependent variable in the probit regression). 
It is possible that our finding regarding water depth is driven by a lack of industry and 
operator experience at these new depths. To investigate the temporal effect of learning, we 
created an indicator for platforms that were installed in water 500 feet deeper than all other Resources for the Future  Muehlenbachs, Cohen, and Gerarden 
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existing platforms at that time. We find that indicators for the first, second, third, fourth and fifth 
year of platforms that were once at the leading edge of water depth were statistically 
insignificant as predictors of company-reported incidents (this specification is not reported in 
Table 8). The results imply that, compared with the average platform, “pioneer” platforms in 
deeper waters do not report more incidents in the first five years after being installed. 
We tried several specifications of pioneering platforms to see whether there was any 
experience effect. For example, we created an indicator for any platform that was in the 99.5th 
percentile of water depth in a given year (Figure 2). This indicator also results in no statistically 
significant findings when water depth is included as a covariate in the regression. We also 
confirm that if water depth is not included in the regression, this indicator is statistically 
significantly positive—that is, if this was the only measure of water depth, then we find that the 
platforms in the 99.5th percentile water depth are more likely to have incidents than those below 
the 99.5th percentile.  
Platform-level production in deep water is on average much higher than production in 
shallow water (Table 2). Therefore, it is plausible that the increase in incidents with water depth 
could in fact be correlated with increased production. Including production volume in the 
regression for reported incidents shows that higher production does increase the probability of an 
incident report (in specifications (3) and (4)); however, as when production is not accounted for, 
the marginal effect of increasing water depth is still significant. The marginal effect of water 
depth also does not change substantially when accounting for drilling activity that year at the 
platform (Drilling Activity (Indicator)). On average platforms in deeper water are more complex: 
they have had more boreholes drilled and more well operations (such as well reentries and 
horizontal drills) than platforms in shallow water. However, even after accounting for the 
cumulative number of well operations and the current number of producing wells at a platform, 
water depth still plays a statistically significant role in determining the probability of an incident. 
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Table 8. Probit Estimates of Nonweather-Related Incidents 
      Specifications     
 (1)  (2)  (3)    (4) 
Water Depth (100 feet)  .00166***  .00108***  .0012***  .00121*** 
 (.000108)  (.000103)  (.000112)  (.000111) 
Age .0000479  .0000904***  .000105***  .000119*** 
 (.0000359)  (.0000336)  (.0000335)  (.0000332) 
Manned 24 Hours (Indicator)  .0798***  .0434***  .0422***  .0421*** 
 (.00352)  (.00264)  (.00266)  (.00266) 
Major Complex (Indicator)  .0306***  .0178***  .0171***  .0167*** 
 (.00149)  (.00124)  (.00124)  (.00122) 
Distance to Shore (miles)  .000142***  .0000695***  .000065***  .0000665*** 
 (.0000172)  (.000015)  (.000015)  (.0000147) 
Year>=2006 (Indicator)  .0261***  .0296***  .0302***  .0202*** 
 (.00134)  (.00136)  (.00139)  (.00283) 
Inactive (Indicator)    -.0207***  -.0214***  -.021*** 
   (.00122)  (.00124)  (.00122) 
Production (mBOE)    2.17e-07  2.84e-07*  3.03e-07** 
   (1.38e-07)  (1.46e-07)  (1.44e-07) 
Drilling Activity (Indicator)    .0317***  .0312***  .0297*** 
   (.00278)  (.00279)  (.00272) 
No. Well Operations    .000432***  .000412***  .000412*** 
   (.0000383)  (.0000377)  (.0000372) 
No. Producing Wells    1.25e-06  -4.21e-06  -.0000413 
   (.000118)  (.000116)  (.000114) 
Lease Operator’s % Ownership      -.0000158  -.0000117 
     (9.94e-06)  (9.81e-06) 
No. Lessees      .000225  .000165 
     (.00019)  (.000188) 
        
District Effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
        
        
Year Effects  No  No  No  Yes 
        
N 76,595  76,595  74,438  74,438 
Pseudo R-squared  0.28314  0.33149  0.33476  0.33724 
Notes: *** significant at the 1% level. Dependent variable: whether a nonweather-related incident occurred on 
platform i in year t. Data on nonweather-related incidents, 1996–2009. Probit slope derivatives (marginal effects) are 
reported. Specification includes a constant term (marginal effect not reported). Standard errors are shown in 
parenthesis. All specifications contain an indicator for the district of jurisdiction, and the last specification contains an 
indicator for the year. Production is the annual production of oil and gas (where gas is converted to thousand barrels of 
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inspection data, each year 90.1 percent of active platforms were inspected at least once from 
1986 through 2009. Other inspections are tailored to the current use of each facility, which can 
range from exploratory activities through production to abandonment. 
Annual and risk-based production inspections both follow similar guidelines (OEMM, 
2009). They are scheduled in advance to enable inspection of platforms in close proximity on the 
same date. Within a given group of facilities, the lead inspector assigns individual inspectors 
based on their inspection records to ensure that an inspector does not visit the same facilities in 
successive years. On the date of inspection, the inspector group, which can range from one to 
seven inspectors, conducts a visual inspection during the helicopter approach and an initial walk 
around the facility to check its general condition. Next, one inspector begins a paperwork review 
while any other inspectors present examine and test the safety equipment designed to prevent 
blowouts, fires, spills, and other major accidents. General violations and specific safety 
equipment failures are documented, and the inspector group issues “Incidents of 
Noncompliance” (INCs) as appropriate. These INCs are classified into three broad categories: 
(1) a warning, in which the operator is ordered to address the problem; (2) a component shut-in, 
which requires the operator to suspend the operation of a piece of equipment that is not 
functioning properly, which may or may not hinder production; and (3) a facility shut-in, which 
requires cessation of all production until the problem is mitigated and verified during a follow-up 
inspection. In addition, INCs can be referred for a civil penalty review. Later, the supervisory 
inspector for each district checks the inspection documentation for accuracy. 
Information on these inspections and the detected INCs were obtained from BOEMRE. 
Between 1986 and August 2010 there were 138,197 inspections on pipelines, meter facilities, 
mobile offshore drilling units, and offshore facilities; 91,775 of these inspections were on 
offshore facilities alone, and these were used for statistical analysis.10 The descriptive statistics 
below show that fewer than 10 percent of historical inspections were unannounced (Table 9). 
Twenty-seven percent of inspections led to the issuance of at least one INC, with an average of 
0.91 INCs issued per inspection (the maximum issued during one inspection was 67, and 
standard deviation is 2.38). As with the incident data, these descriptive statistics reveal variation 
with water depth; however, the trend was reversed: on average, fewer INCs were issued to 
                                                 
10 Because the date the platform was recorded to have been installed is after the date of the inspection, 369 of these 
inspections do not match. 
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platforms in deeper water (Table 10). 
 
Table 9. Descriptive Statistics of Platform Inspections 
 mean  sd  min  max  count 
No. Inspectors  1.424  .6321  1  7  91775 
Unannounced (Indicator)  .09293  .2903  0  1  91775 
Inspection Time (hours)  3.323  6.548  0  702  91774 
Components Inspected  19.08  27.39  0  356  82570 
INC Issued (Indicator)  .2748  .4464  0  1  91775 
No. INCs Issued  .91  2.383  0  67  91775 
INCs per Unit Time  .3846  1.278  0  67  89900 
INCs per Component  .1115  .4426  0  23  77251 
Rescinded INCs  .006974  .1415  0  14  91775 
No. Warnings  .3526  1.19  0  41  91775 
No. Component Shut-ins  .3927  1.374  0  66  91775 
INCs toward Facility Shut-in .02441  .2105  0  15  91775 
INCs to Civil Penalty Review  .01366  .2357  0  34  91775 
Cum. Inspections (t-1)  11.47  9.903  0  82  91775 
Cum. INCs (t-1)  14.22  25.64  0  278  91775 
Cum. Civil Penalty Reviews (t-1)  .1258  .852  0  35  91775 
Note: Data on all offshore platform facilities, 1986–2010. 
Table 10. Descriptive Statistics of Platform Inspections, by Water Depth 
 Shallow  Deep  Ultra-deep 
  mean sd mean sd  mean  sd 
No. Inspectors  1.497  .711  1.843  .9242  2.011  .9777 
Unannounced  (Indicator)  .2001 .4001 .1306 .3372  0  0 
Inspection Time (hours)  6.93  10.26  17.2  21.76  19.02  24.66 
Components  Inspected  41.39 37.99 78.68 78.45  95.82  101.9 
INC Issued (Indicator)  .4056  .491  .2588  .4382  .08696  .2833 
No. INCs Issued  1.616  3.332  .873  2.34  .2065  .8713 
INCs per Unit Time  .2879  .8269  .08915  .3377  .01667  .08817 
INCs  per  Component  .1096 .4899 .0498 .2359 .005032 .01678 
Rescinded INCs  .01321  .1964  .03144 .4579  .02174  .1466 
No. Warnings  .6092  1.69  .3676  1.215  .07609  .3987 
No.  Component  Shut-ins  .7558 1.981 .4728 1.443  .1304  .539 
INCs toward Facility Shut-in  .04496 .3038 .01209 .1628  0  0 
INCs to Civil Penalty Review  .02894  .3084  .01935  .1764  0  0 
Cum.  Inspections  (t-1)  18.15 13.23 14.71 11.85  6.13  4.82 
Cum. INCs (t-1)  33.55  37.6  14.32  18.41  1.62  2.343 
Cum. Civil Penalty Reviews (t-1)  .3338  1.382  .1415  .3974  0  0 
Observations 20664    827    92   
Note: Data on all offshore platform facilities classified as major complexes that are manned 24 hours a day, 1986–
2010.   Resources for the Future  Muehlenbachs, Cohen, and Gerarden 
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Inspectors 
The inspection data obtained from BOEMRE include unique identifying information for 
up to four inspectors for each inspection (of a maximum of seven inspectors).
11 This additional 
information allows for study of individual inspectors’ characteristics, predictive capabilities 
using historical data, and any evidence of relationship-building between inspectors and operators 
or platforms. The data were reorganized to link inspection characteristics with individual 
inspectors. Specific variables were created for each inspection by each inspector with a time lag 
to exclude the current inspection information (e.g., cumulative number of INCs before the 
current inspection). These variables were condensed to the level of the inspection group. For 
example, for each inspection, the average over the inspector group of the average time for all of 
the past inspections by each inspector was created. Table 11 summarizes inspector variables, 
averaged across the inspection group. For example, the average inspector had completed 1,013 
inspections at any point in time between 1986 and 2010 and had issued a total of 416.7 warnings 
and 30.1 facility shut-ins. 
 
Table 11. Inspector–Specific Descriptive Statistics 
 mean  sd  min  max  count 
Cum. Inspections by I  1013  811.9  1  4732  91775 
Cum. Warnings Issued by I  416.7  508.6  1  4221  91775 
Cum. Component Shut-ins Issued by I  490.6  556.4  1  4288  91775 
Cum. Facility Shut-ins Issued by I  30.1  28.65  .5  200  91775 
Cum. INCs Issued by I  1099  1159  1  8740  91775 
Cum. INCs to Civil Penalty Review by I  17.57  23  0  162  91775 
Average Inspection Time of I  4.389  1.854  0  40.25  91775 
Notes: Data on all offshore platform facilities, 1986–2010. All statistics are based on the last inspection (i.e., 
cumulative inspections by inspector I prior to the current inspection). I = inspector. The observation is the 
inspection; if the inspection had more than one inspector, the variable is the average over the inspectors. 
Because we are able to link each inspector to an actual inspection, we have compiled 
platform-specific and platform operator-specific inspector information. Tables 12 and 13 
describe the historical inspection linkages between inspectors and platforms and operators. For 
example, from Table 12, we see that at any point in time, an inspector who is visiting a particular 
                                                 
11 Our interest is in understanding the role of inspectors in enforcement and compliance; we are not interested in 
identifying any individual inspector. We have thus removed any identifying information from the data. Instead, each 
inspector has an anonymous but unique identifying code. Resources for the Future  Muehlenbachs, Cohen, and Gerarden 
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platform has previously inspected the same platform 1.2 times, with the maximum being 37 
previous visits. Similarly, from Table 12, we see that at any point in time, the average inspector 
has inspected any platform of a platform operator 98.4 times. Later, in the regression analysis, 
we use these data to further investigate these relationships and determine whether past inspection 
characteristics predict outcomes of future inspections when linked to both the inspector and the 
operator or platform. Similarly, platform characteristics were analyzed to determine whether past 
performance influenced the likelihood of receiving an INC (Table 14). 
 
Table 12. Inspector-Platform–Specific Descriptive Statistics 
 mean  sd  min  max  count 
Cum. Inspections of P by I  1.228  2.138  0  37  91775 
Cum. INCs Issued to P by I  1.45  4.312  0  106  91775 
Cum. Warnings Issued to P by I  .5085  1.839  0  47.5  91775 
Cum. Component Shut-ins Issued to P by I  .6175  2.198  0  90  91775 
Cum. Facility Shut-ins Issued to P by I  .03696  .2605  0  15  91775 
Cum. Civil Penalty Reviews of P by I  .02007  .2931  0  34  91775 
Notes: Data on all offshore platform facilities, 1986–2010. All statistics are based on the last inspection (i.e., 
cumulative inspections of platform (P) by inspector (I) prior to the current inspection). P = platform; I = inspector. 
The observation is the inspection; if the inspection had more than one inspector, the variable is the average over the 
inspectors. 
Table 13. Inspector-Operator–Specific Descriptive Statistics 
 mean  sd  min  max  count 
Cum. Inspections of O by I  98.41  188.4  0  1825  91775 
Cum. INCs Issued to O by I  73.4  147.1  0  1600  91775 
Cum. Warnings Issued to O by I  24.96  59.11  0  750  91775 
Cum. Component Shut-ins Issued to O by I  29.54  67.05  0  821  91775 
Cum. Facility Shut-ins Issued to O by I  1.342  2.861  0  23  91775 
Cum. Civil Penalty Reviews of O by I  .4431  2.513  0  54  91775 
Notes: Data on all offshore platform facilities, 1986–2010. All statistics are based on the last inspection (i.e., 
cumulative inspections of platforms operated by operator (O) by inspector (I) prior to the current inspection). O = 
operator; I = inspector. The observation is the inspection; if the inspection had more than one inspector, the variable 
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Table 14. Platform–Specific Descriptive Statistics 
 mean  sd  min  max  count 
Cum. Inspections of P  11.47  9.903  0  82  91775 
Cum. INCs Issued to P  14.22  25.64  0  278  91775 
INC Issued to P  .2846  .4512  0  1  91775 
Cum. Warnings Issued to P  .2194  1.15  0  32  6281 
Warning Issued to P  .1565  .3633  0  1  91775 
Cum. Component Shut-ins Issued to P  .2629  1.351  0  36  6281 
Component Shut-in Issued to P  .157  .3638  0  1  91775 
Cum. Facility Shut-ins Issued to P  .02038  .1936  0  6  6281 
Facility Shut-in Issued to P  .0186  .1351  0  1  91775 
Cum. Civil Penalty Reviews of P  .1258  .852  0  35  91775 
Civil Penalty Review of P  .007747  .08768  0  1  91775 
Notes: Data on all offshore platform facilities, 1986–2010. All statistics are based on the last inspection (i.e., 
cumulative inspections of platform (P) prior to the current inspection). P = platform. 
Regression Analysis of Incidents of Noncompliance 
Probit regression analysis is used to examine the effect of water depth on the probability 
of receiving an INC while controlling for other platform characteristics. Table 15 reports on an 
analysis of inspections of all active platforms between 1996 and 2010.
12 We estimate four probit 
regressions to examine (1) the probability that any INC is issued upon an inspection; (2) the 
probability that a component shut-in is issued upon an inspection; (3) the probability that a 
facility shut-in is issued upon an inspection; and (4) an ordered probit of the probability of a 
warning, component shut-in or facility shut-in. In all specifications we include a fixed effect for 
the type of inspection (if there were more than 15 observations from an inspection type), district, 
and year. 
The majority of the inspections are complete production inspections and “sampling” 
production inspections (where a random sample of components is inspected), but other types 
include accident investigations, meter inspections, and environmental inspections. In contrast 
with the estimates on company-reported incidents, platforms operating in deeper waters are less 
likely to receive INCs of any type. Other factors, namely, age, distance to the shore, the number 
of well operations, and whether the platform is a major complex have similar effects as in the 
                                                 
12 Tables 12–14 are based on the full set of data from 1986 through 2010 for both active and inactive platforms, 
resulting in 91,775 platform-years. Table 15 is based only on active wells during the years for which we have 
production data, 1996 through 2010, resulting in 30,054 platform-years. Resources for the Future  Muehlenbachs, Cohen, and Gerarden 
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company-reported incident regression. The quantity of oil and gas produced from a platform 
does not increase the probability of an enforcement action; however, the number of producing 
wells does. A larger number of producing wells (as measured by the number of producing 
boreholes) increases the likelihood of an INC. A greater number of operations (where each 
borehole can have more than one operation, such as horizontal drilling or reentry) results in a 
reduced likelihood of an INC. Older platforms are more likely to receive INCs, with the 
exception of component and facility shut-ins, where age does not appear to play a role. As with 
the estimates on incidents, major complexes that are farther from shore are more likely to receive 
INCs of all types. Those that are manned 24 hours a day are found to have more component shut-
ins. As expected, increasing the number of inspectors or the length of inspection increases the 
probability that an INC of any type is issued. 
Including the percentage of past inspections that resulted in an INC in the analysis 
suggests that poor performance is persistent. Platforms that were more likely to have been issued 
an INC in a past inspection (as calculated by the percentage of inspections that resulted in an 
INC) were also more likely to receive an INC from the current inspection. If a warning, 
component shut-in, or facility shut-in was issued in the inspection immediately prior, there is 
also an increased probability that an INC is issued during the current inspection. We cannot say 
whether the INCs have no effect on noncompliance; however, this last finding suggests that 
enforcement actions do not fully ensure future compliance.  These results correspond to remarks 
made by the director of BOEMRE, that “sanctions that are currently available to deter and punish 
violations of safety and environmental standards and regulations, must be substantially 
strengthened” (Bromwich, 2010). Still, there is reason to believe that inspections and penalties 
have some effect; for example, Cohen (1986) finds that inspections have a deterrent effect on oil 
spills from tanker transfer operations.
13 
We obtain mixed results when we examine the frequency that inspectors visited the same 
platforms or platforms operated by the same company in the past.  The estimates suggest that the 
more times an inspector (or average over the group of inspectors) has visited a platform in the 
past (Cum. Inspections of P by I at t-1), the less likely the inspector is to issue an INC during the 
current inspection. This is shown by examining the number of times that each inspector visited 
                                                 
13 See also Cohen (2000) for a review of the empirical literature on enforcement and oil spills from tanker 
operations. More recently, Eckert (2004) has examined inspections and compliance of petroleum storage facilities 
and suggested that inspections have only a small deterrent effect on future noncompliance. Resources for the Future  Muehlenbachs, Cohen, and Gerarden 
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the platform in the past. However, the effect of an inspector’s visiting many platforms operated 
by the same operator in the past (Cum. Inspections of O by I at t-1) is not found to be significant.  
The higher the percentage of inspections that lead to an INC for that platform by the inspector in 
the past (percentage Inspections of P by I with INCs in t-1), the higher the probability of an 
INC—suggesting that there is either persistence in noncompliance or an ongoing relationship 
between the inspector and the platform. However, the opposite is true when this analysis is 
expanded to encompass all platforms of an operator. The percentage of all the inspections 
performed by the inspector of an operator’s platforms that resulted in an INC (percentage of O 
by I with INCs in t-1) is negatively correlated with the probability of an INC. Although these 
results are only suggestive and further research is warranted, it appears that whether a platform is 
found to be in noncompliance varies by inspector. Resources for the Future  Muehlenbachs, Cohen, and Gerarden 
25 
 
Table 15. Probit Estimates of Enforcement Action (Marginal Effects) 
 
 (1) Any INC Binary 
Probit  
 (2) Component 
Shut-in Binary 
Probit 
(3) Facility  
Shut-in Binary 
Probit 
 (4) Ordered 
INC Probit 
 
Water Depth (100 feet)  -.000142***  -.000126***  -8.50e-06**  -.000141*** 
 (.0000129)  (.000011)  (3.30e-06)  (.0000129) 
Production (mBOE)  1.18e-06  1.50e-06  -6.90e-07  1.18e-06 
 (1.19e-06)  (9.73e-07)  (4.31e-07)  (1.19e-06) 
No. Producing Wells  .00352***  .00322***  .000324  .00355*** 
 (.00103)  (.000806)  (.000213)  (.00103) 
No. Well Operations  -.000685*  -.000634**  -.0000792  -.000684* 
 (.000358)  (.000286)  (.000076)  (.000358) 
Age .000787**  -.000294  .0000397  .000801*** 
 (.000308)  (.00025)  (.0000728)  (.000308) 
Manned 24 Hours (Indicator)  .0103  .0122*  .000189  .0102 
 (.00821)  (.00639)  (.00168)  (.00821) 
Major Complex (Indicator)  .099***  .0909***  .0106***  .0989*** 
 (.00721)  (.00567)  (.00169)  (.00721) 
Distance to Shore (miles)  .000791***  .000635***  .0000978***  .000794*** 
 (.000122)  (.0000968)  (.0000263)  (.000122) 
No. Inspectors (t)  .0315***  .021***  .00626***  .0314*** 
 (.00418)  (.00329)  (.000884)  (.00418) 
Inspection Time (hours) (t)  .0118***  .0088***  .00028***  .0118*** 
 (.00038)  (.000282)  (.0000493)  (.00038) 
% Inspections with INCs (t-1)  .000297***  .000194***  .0000281***  .000296*** 
 (.0000328)  (.0000246)  (6.00e-06)  (.0000328) 
No. Ps Operated by O (t)  -.0000986***  -.000024*  -9.56e-06**  -.0000993*** 
 (.0000164)  (.0000132)  (4.15e-06)  (.0000164) 
Warning Issued to P (t-1)  .0328***  .0144**  .00226  .033*** 
 (.00728)  (.00575)  (.00162)  (.00728) Resources for the Future  Muehlenbachs, Cohen, and Gerarden 
26 
Component Shut-in Issued to P (t-1)  .0415***  .0392***  .00226  .0415*** 
 (.0076)  (.00618)  (.00167)  (.00759) 
Facility Shut-in Issued to P (t-1) .0113  .00564 .0112***  .0115 
 (.0165)  (.0125)  (.00431)  (.0165) 
Civil Penalty Review of P (t-1)  .0604***  .0435**  -.000698  .0607*** 
 (.0235)  (.0187)  (.00389)  (.0235) 
Cum. Inspections of P (t-1)  .0006  .000463  .000051  .000589 
 (.000471)  (.000368)  (.000102)  (.00047) 
Cum. Inspections of P by I (t-1)  -.00926***  -.00481***  -.00119***  -.00927*** 
 (.00155)  (.00125)  (.000414)  (.00155) 
% Inspections of P by I with INCs (t-1)  .0000976***  .0000688***  1.87e-06  .0000973*** 
 (.0000146)  (.0000106)  (2.48e-06)  (.0000146) 
Cum. Inspections of O by I (t-1)  8.88e-06  -.0000182  -3.01e-06  9.05e-06 
 (.0000155)  (.0000133)  (4.69e-06)  (.0000155) 
% Inspections of O by I with INCs (t-1)  -.000282***  -.000131***  -.000036***  -.000282*** 
 (.0000144)  (.0000112)  (4.85e-06)  (.0000144) 
Year Effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
        
District Effects  Yes   Yes  Yes  Yes  
        
Inspection Type Effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
        
N 30,054  30,054  29,986  30,054 
Pseudo R-squared  0.13458  0.14568  0.11659  0.13444 
Notes: *** significant at the 1% level, ** 5% level, * 10% level. Specifications: (1) probit regression for whether 1 or more warnings was issued at 
platform during an inspection at t; (2) probit for whether 1 or more component shut-ins were issued; (3) probit for whether a facility shut-in was 
issued; (4) ordered probit for an inspection without any INCs, with a warning, component shut-in, or facility shut-in. O = operator; I = inspector; P = 
platform. Probit slope derivatives (marginal effects) are reported. Specification includes a constant term (marginal effect not reported). Standard errors 
are shown in parenthesis. Production is the annual production of oil and gas (where gas is converted to thousand barrels of oil equivalent (mBOE) 
with 0.178 bbl per thousand cubic feet (mcf). Data on inspections, 1996–August 2010.  Resources for the Future  Muehlenbachs, Cohen, and Gerarden 
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5. Company Effects 
The regressions of company-reported incidents (Table 8) and enforcement action (Table 
15) are now re-estimated to include indicators for major oil producers. The 10 companies that 
produced the most oil and gas from the Gulf of Mexico in 2009 are included as separate dummy 
variables in the regressions, with the remaining companies left in the regression as the base case. 
Table 16 tabulates the number of platforms, production levels, and incident characteristics for the 
top 10 producers in 2009. In 2009, BP was the largest producer of oil in the Gulf, followed by 
Shell, Chevron, and Anadarko. Combined, the top 10 companies accounted for 75 percent of 
total production in the Gulf between 1996 and 2009. 
 
Table 16. Operator Characteristics by Top-Producing Operators in 2009 

















    
BP 269  9 1.9740 3340 .3629 .0201 .0030
Shell 160  9 6.1497 6057 .6964 .0091 .0030
Chevron 1022  5 .3694 3108 .1222 .0075 .0013
Anadarko 276  8 .7583 1189 .0957 .0147 .0026
BHP Billiton  6  3 8.2985 340 1.0976 .0000 .0000
Apache 523  0 .2097 631 .1227 .0090 .0013
Eni US  78  3 .9115 489 .1716 .0168 .0019
Exxon Mobil  230  2 .7461 1098 .1719 .0204 .0007
W&T Offshore  205  0 .1707 181 .1210 .0085 .0019
Murphy Expl & Prod  248  3 .2228 348 .1376 .0019 .0000
Other 3445  10 .2095 5736 .1043 .0069 .0012
Data from 1996–2009. The table lists operators in order of total 2009 production volume. “No. Platforms” is the 
count of unique platforms ever operated from 1996 to 2009. Production data are listed by millions of barrel of oil 
equivalent (mmBOE). “Avg. Platform Prod.” is the average production per platform year. “Operator Prod” is the 
cumulative production summed over all years and platforms. “Avg. No. Incidents” is the average per platform year.  
Estimates are fairly uniform across different specifications of the probit for company-
reported incidents and the ordered probit of enforcement action, and therefore only the last 
specification from each is displayed (Table 17). The probit estimation of company-reported 
incidents (first column of Table 17) suggests that the probability of a reported incident increases 
with BP as an operator compared with operators that are not among the top 10 producers. The 
probability that the average platform would have a reported incident in any given year is 1.4 Resources for the Future  Muehlenbachs, Cohen, and Gerarden 
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percent. The marginal effect of BP as an operator increases the probability of a reported incident 
by 1.35 percentage points—nearly doubling the probability of an incident. The marginal effect of 
having BP as an operator is surpassed only by BHP Billiton—an increase in 6.3 percentage 
points. Note that these are self-reported incidents. Hence, without further study, it is not possible 
to know whether the higher level of incidents for BP and BHP Billiton are the result of poorer 
safety records or a higher level of compliance with self-reporting requirements. Put differently, it 
is possible that BP and BHP Billiton simply report more incidents than the rest of the industry. 
A poorly performing company is expected to be more likely to have incidents to report, 
and likewise more likely to receive INCs when they are inspected. The signs on the coefficients 
of company indicators are not always consistent across the incident probit and the ordered INC 
probit, including in the case of BP. That is, BP is less likely to receive an INC upon an inspection 
than other companies not included in the top 10 producers. However, the increase in the 
probability of INCs from having BP as an operator is small in proportion to the baseline 
probability of an INC, and statistically significant at only p<.10. The probability of receiving an 
INC for the average platform is 28 percent, and having BP as an operator would decrease that 
probability by only 2.67 percentage points, or roughly 9.5 percent. Without further study, it is 
impossible to know whether the slightly lower INC rate for BP is the result of a better 
compliance record or a smaller percentage of infractions culminating in enforcement actions. 
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 Table 17. Company Effects in Probit Regressions  
 (1) Incident binary  
probit  
(2) Ordered INC 
probit 
Covariates   Table 8, Specification  
4 
Table 15, Specification  
4 
    
BP .0135***  -.0267* 
 (.00309)  (.0145) 
Shell -.000746  .0555*** 
 (.0023)  (.0196) 
Chevron .00466***  -.0647*** 
 (.00124)  (.0186) 
Anadarko -.00347*  .00026 
 (.00175)  (.0151) 
BHP Billiton  .0631**  .00294 
 (.0493)  (.14) 
Apache -.00337**  -.0328*** 
 (.00123)  (.0118) 
Eni US  -.00601**  -.0526* 
 (.0021)  (.0258) 
Exxon Mobil  -.00138  -.0101 
 (.00184)  (.0157) 
W&T Offshore  .00052  -.0134 
 (.00242)  (.0175) 
Murphy Expl & Prod  -.000161  -.0206 
 (.00284)  (.018) 
  
N 74,438  30,054 
Pseudo R-squared  0.33996  0.13520 
  
*** significant at the 1% level, ** 5% level, * 10% level. Specifications include covariates from (1) Table 8 and (2) 
Table 15. Dependent variables: (1) whether a nonweather related incident occurred on platform i in year t, using data 
on nonweather related incidents; (2) ordered probit for an inspection without any INCs, with a warning, component 
shut-in or facility shut-in, using data on inspections. Data from 1996 to 2009, although variables such as the 
cumulative number of inspections were created using data back to 1986. Probit slope derivatives (marginal effects) 
are reported. Standard errors are shown in parenthesis. 
6. Conclusions 
This paper reports on a preliminary analysis of performance indicators on platforms in 
the Gulf of Mexico between 1996 and 2010. Although our findings are preliminary, an analysis 
of the data provides evidence of the value of empirical investigations of firm safety and 
environmental performance as well as government inspection and enforcement activities. 
Statistical analysis reveals that company-reported incidents (such as blowouts, fires, injuries, and Resources for the Future  Muehlenbachs, Cohen, and Gerarden 
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pollution) increase with water depth, controlling for platform characteristics such as age, quantity 
of oil and gas produced, and number of producing wells. For an average platform (i.e., a platform 
with the sample average age, annual production, number of producing wells, and other 
characteristics), each 100 feet of added depth increases the probability of a company-reported 
incident by 8.5 percent. 
In addition to self-reported incidents, we have examined government inspections and 
enforcement actions (warning, component shut-in, facility shut-in, and civil penalty review) 
following an inspection. Fewer incidents of noncompliance are detected during inspections on 
deepwater platforms than on platforms in shallow water; however, the magnitude of the effect of 
depth on noncompliance is not large: with each 100 feet of added depth, the probability of an 
incident of noncompliance decreases by 0.05 percent. We also provide a preliminary analysis of 
the effect of prior findings of noncompliance and conclude that noncompliance is persistent. Our 
results also suggest that findings of noncompliance vary by inspector. 
Examining the 10 companies that produced the most oil and gas in the Gulf of Mexico in 
2009 indicates significant variation in company-reported incidents and incidents of 
noncompliance across companies. The analysis suggests that the probability of a reported 
incident increases with BP as an operator (all else equal) compared with operators not included 
in the 10 largest producers (by volume). Of the 10 largest producers, BHP Billiton is the only 
firm with a higher probability of reporting an incident than BP. When we examine the 
probability of receiving an enforcement action upon inspection, we find that BP is less likely to 
receive an enforcement action than are smaller producers. For the average platform, having BP 
as an operator increases the probability of a company-reported incident by 96 percent and 
decreases the probability of an enforcement action upon inspection by 9.5 percent. 
The variables of interest for each analysis were chosen based on supporting literature and 
the availability of data provided by BOEMRE. The agency’s incident data reflect only those 
incidents that have been reported or detected; other research has demonstrated the likelihood of 
discrepancies between actual and recorded incidents (Jablonowski 2007). Shultz (1999) also 
points out reliability concerns and recommends improving “data acquisition, data entry, and 
database management efforts” (p. 55) as well as regularly updating and eliminating errors in the 
records to increase the confidence of any conclusions drawn from these data. These activities are 
beyond the scope of this work; as a result, the quantitative findings of this report should be taken 
in light of the data limitations. Resources for the Future  Muehlenbachs, Cohen, and Gerarden 
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In addition to providing important insights, this preliminary analysis has raised many 
questions that are worthy of further research using the compiled data. First, this analysis is 
specific to offshore platforms. Data on mobile offshore drilling units are more difficult to 
analyze because we have data only on reported incidents. Since we do not know where these 
drilling units are when they do not have an incident, it is not possible to calculate a rate of 
incidents. However, further data collection and refinement, with an analysis of mobile drilling 
unit inspection results, might prove useful.  
Second, we find that if an incident of noncompliance has been detected during a prior 
inspection, another incident of noncompliance is more likely. A poorly performing platform is 
more likely to have received an incident of noncompliance in the past but also more likely to 
receive one in the future, so it is difficult to determine whether the enforcement action in the past 
changed any behavior: the platform could possibly have been an even poorer performer without 
the past enforcement action. Further statistical analysis of enforcement and noncompliance data 
should provide important insights into the causal connections between inspections, warnings, 
component and facility shut-ins, and civil penalty review and subsequent reported incidents and 
incidents of noncompliance.  
Third, we find significant variability in the probability of a company-reported incident by 
type of company. This is using a very broad definition of incidents, which include everything 
from a loss of well control to a fatality. It would be interesting to examine differences in specific 
types of incidents as well as firm characteristics (e.g., size, financial capacity, ownership 
structure). 
Finally, future research should investigate the relationship between self-reported 
incidents, findings of noncompliance, and actual performance. Our analysis of incidents is 
necessarily based on self-reporting. Although firms that self-report a higher level of accidents or 
spills are generally more likely to be cited for noncompliance during an inspection, some 
exceptions are found. For example, both BP and Chevron had a higher-than-average incident rate 
but were less likely to be cited for noncompliance. Without further analysis, we do not know 
whether this is because these firms are more likely to self-report than others or a sign of sub-
optimal enforcement. 
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4,300 103  9,000  29,100  Y  Y 
Apache Public 
APA 
Houston 3,452  -292  8,574  37,560  Y  Y 














London 39,570  5,877  50,535  76,400  Y  Y 
BP p.l.c.  Public 
BP 










Houston 30,000  4,858  152,840  90,660  Y  Y 
Deep Gulf 
Energy Lp 
(funded by First 
Reserve 
Corporation) 
Private Houston  16  —  —  —  N  Y 
Devon Energy  Public 
DVN 




Private Houston  45  —  —  —  Y  Y 
Eni S. p. A.  Public 
ADR 































Houston 328  -319  942  2,610  N  Y 
Marubeni Public 
MARUY 







El Dorado, AZ  8,369  837  19,012  12,510  Y  Y 
Newfield 
Exploration 
Gulf Coast LLC 
Public 
NFX 
Houston   1,148  542  1,338  7,870  Y  Y 
Nexen Inc.   Public 
NXY/PB 















Buenos Aires  4,326  242  3,113  1,884  N  Y 
Placid Refining 
Company 































San Antonio  20,920  -1982  68,144.00  10,193  N  Y 




Houston 286  -187  611  820  Y  Y 
Walter Oil & 
Gas 
Corporation 
Private Houston  —  —  41  —  Y  Y 
Note: All dollars are in millions, most recent data available. Sources: public documents, including SEC filings. 
 
 